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6. The Crisis of ‘the Crisis 
of Europe’
Albena Azmanova
It is not a dirty secret that there has never been a popular appetite for 
the idea of Europe – the European Union has been an elite project, and 
a highly pragmatic one at that. There is nothing very inspiring about the 
four European Freedoms – freedom of movement of goods, services, 
people and money – anyone ready to die for these freedoms must be 
out of their mind. It is logical, then, that citizen indifference has been 
one of the most persistent sources of the infamous ‘crisis of Europe’. 
Just a few years ago, in 2012, I was invited to speak at a Battle of Ideas 
session in London on a panel entitled ‘Is Europe Boring?’ – the year 
when the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
Well, Europe is no longer boring, and the UK’s referendum vote in June 
put an end to the crisis of indifference. Brexit and the passions it stirred 
displayed that Europe matters – that it is a matter of intense importance 
to the formerly indifferent citizens. In a way, Brexit transformed Eu-
rope from a project of elites to a project of its citizens – it gave birth to 
a new Europe – whose existence is afirmed equally in the gestures of 
endorsement as in those of rejection. Conlicts, turbulence and affect, 
be it positive or negative, are symptoms of the existence, even of the 
vitality, of an entity.
However, Brexit created a curious situation which I would like to 
describe as ‘crisis of a crisis’. A crisis is a state of extreme challenge to 
an entity’s existence that marks a turning point with just two possible 
outcomes – either death or transformation. Shortly after the negative 
vote in June, it became clear that leaving the Union is not a solution 
to the concerns that motivated the ‘leave’ vote, and that exit from the 
Union creates more problems than it solves. As Britain acted on its 
from European Union and Disunion: Reflections 
on European Identity 
edited by Ash Amin and Philip Lewis 
British Academy, London 2017
42 European Union and Disunion //  British Academy
Tanatos, its death drive, it eliminated the death of the EU as a viable 
solution to the crisis – thus, it solved the existential crisis of the Un-
ion. How about the other solution to the crisis – transformation? The 
transformative power of crises is exactly how the integration of Europe 
was meant to proceed. To quote Jean Monnet, one of the founders of 
the Union: ‘I have always believed that Europe would be built through 
crises, and that it would be the sum of their solutions’. It is pragmati-
cally and incrementally, but also by means of solving crises, that an ever 
closer union was to be built.
However, nowadays the road of transformations is blocked by radical 
disagreements (Eastern and Western member states oppose each 
other on social policy, and the North and South of Europe are at log-
gerheads on economic policy.) We are stuck. We are in a situation of 
radical ungovernability in which, as Claus Offe has observed, it is very 
well known what should be done to solve the crisis (e.g. large-scale 
and long-term debt mutualisation resulting in social transfers between 
member states and between social classes), yet these rather obvious 
solutions are considered politically unfeasible, nay, unthinkable. If what 
is well known is unthinkable, one is in real trouble. (This reminds me 
of the last years of the communist regime in Bulgaria when we were 
haunted by a sense that what is happening was neither right nor wrong, 
it was simply abnormal, and of us being stuck into what seemed like 
a perpetual abnormality.)
So, as Europe survived its existential crisis, it inds itself in a situation 
far worse – what I call a ‘crisis of a crisis’ – in which death, that is, the 
dissolution of the Union, is not an option, but neither is transformation 
in the ofing.
I do not believe that a road ahead can be found in grand ideas such as 
the recently fashioned Global Foreign Policy and Security Strategy. Such 
grand visions tend to be divisive. But there is a path, the traces of which 
can be discerned in the reasons for the earlier tacit endorsement of the 
project, of the times when Europe was boring.
Publics endorsed their leaders’ experimentation in political and econom-
ic integration due to a broadly shared belief in the benevolent power of 
Europe. According to the narrative identity that the EU governing bodies 
have been actively generating, the integration of national economies en-
sured the prosperity-in-peace which Europeans have enjoyed in the sec-
ond half of the 20th century. This is why the EU was awarded the Nobel 
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Peace Prize ive years ago. Even if the causality behind that reasoning 
is questionable (we might have achieved both peace and prosperity 
without said integration), the belief in the healing power of ‘belonging 
to Europe’ rests on a more broadly shared notion – that such belonging 
enables nations to reach their excellence: belonging to Europe makes 
us no less British, Bulgarian, or German, it helps us be British, Bulgarian 
or German at our best. Let us call this Europe’s vocation for achieving 
national exemplarity.
This positive attachment to Europe as an uplifting force was tangi-
ble when the post-communist states of East and Central Europe 
were preparing to join the EU. Let me resort to the example I know 
best – that of my native Bulgaria. Bulgarians have always looked up to 
‘Europe’ as a source of a superior manner of being modern (the word 
‘European’ is used as a synonym of ‘civilized’ and ‘sophisticated’) – it 
designates a certain noble modernity. Joining Europe was meant to 
compensate certain ‘Balkan provincialism’ as well as a deiciency in 
being modern – to be Bulgarian at our best. This is a narrative that long 
predated the communist regimes. With the fall of communism, another 
dimension of attachment to Europe emerged – of course, people 
were seduced by the afluence of the West, but they also saw the EU 
as a force able to protect them from their corrupt political elites who 
were robbing them of their chance to become properly, nobly, modern. 
The EU was seen as a way of Bulgaria becoming a democracy at its best.
I believe this role of Europe in achieving national exemplarity is more 
broadly valid. For Germany, EU membership has helped cleanse the idea 
of national greatness from the toxins of chauvinism, thus gaining Germa-
ny the image of a benevolent power. For Britain and France, EU member-
ship allowed cosmopolitanism without imperialism. It is this function of 
exemplarity that Europe has lost. The growing disaffection with Europe 
now in Bulgaria as well as in other new member states has much to do 
with the EU disappointing these hopes, as political corruption, misman-
agement and impoverishment have increased since accession. Many 
Bulgarians now experience themselves as being ‘at their worst’, and do 
not hesitate to blame the EU for this. The same, I believe, goes for other 
member states – from Britain to Greece, the EU is being accused of 
bringing countries to their worst state. We should not blame this simply 
on politics of ‘post-truth’ – misinformation and manipulation of public 
opinion by the mass media and wicked politicians. There is an additional, 
overarching cause which I would like to address in some detail.
44 European Union and Disunion //  British Academy
Some 20 years ago, the policy regime of the EU took the shape of 
what I would like to call a socially irresponsible rule – rule where political 
and economic policy objectives are pursued without regard for their 
impact on society. This is neither a matter of bad will nor of ideological 
commitments, but rather a matter of the institutionalised distribution 
of policy competencies in the EU. Let me explain.
The Single European Act was adopted in 1987, came into force in 1994 
and thus inaugurated an integrated economic space – a single market 
among all member-states. Since then, the protection of this trans- 
European market economy became the core function of the EU 
decisional bodies. This is engraved in the distribution and stratiication 
of policy competencies in the Union. The EU has an exclusive compe-
tence in ensuring the competitive nature of the single market, as well as 
in matters of commercial policy; EU law in these spheres has suprem-
acy and direct effect vis-à-vis national legislation. The logic of market 
eficiency thus gained political hegemony in disregard of the social 
consequences of market eficiency – a job left to the member states. 
Thus on the level of EU decisional bodies, a raison d’Économie began 
functioning as a raison d’État. It is the very constitutional structure of 
EU policy that established a socially irresponsible rule in Europe.
There has been one distinct impact of this on European societies – they 
have been plagued by massive economic and social uncertainty. We 
have heard repeatedly that Brexit, and generally disaffection with 
Europe, is a revolt by the losers of globalisation. I do not believe this 
hypothesis is correct. Note, for instance, that the 52% of Brits who 
mobilised for exit from the EU united very strange bed-fellows: the ‘los-
ers of globalisation’ saw the EU as imposing threatening to them open 
border policies, while the winners of globalisation (the political leader-
ship of the Brexit campaign) deemed that the EU was preventing Britain 
from being a free-trading, deregulated, competitive entrepôt. Thus, 
taking back control meant different things to these very different groups. 
Yet the common denominator was regaining control to ight uncertainty.
What I call an institutionalised socially irresponsible rule – rule without 
regard of the social consequences of policies – is destabilising life-
worlds; it is triggering risk-aversion instincts even among the winners of 
globalisation and is prompting people to seek, in vain, shelter in national 
economic sovereignty (which is often mistaken as a quest for more  
democracy). Telling in this regard is the nature of anti-immigrant senti-
ment (xenophobia), which is worth addressing.
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While the rise of xenophobia is usually a consequence of economic 
malaise and political turmoil (as in the Nazi Germany of the 1930s), the 
current wave of xenophobia arose in the afluent 1990s in conditions of 
robust growth, rising living standards and low unemployment. Impor-
tantly, the anti-immigrant sentiment was not triggered by the economic 
crises, it preceded it. However, the afluent 1990s were also the time of 
rapid economic liberalisation and open-market policies enacted under 
the EU agenda for global competitiveness. Populist leaders managed to 
mobilise unprecedented support, banking on the nebulous fears, rather 
than the distinct risks, the policies of open borders had unleashed. Thus, 
a new order-and-security public agenda of concerns emerged, with four 
elements – physical insecurity, political disorder, cultural estrangement 
and employment insecurity. It is this agenda that the new populist par-
ties and movements have effectively endorsed as their political platform, 
while centre-left and centre-right political establishments remained 
trapped by their old ideological commitments.
The new populism is using the old language of xenophobia, but is driven 
by quite different motivation than the political chauvinism and cultural  
arrogance that deined the post-WWII far-right. The hostility to foreign-
ers now is predominantly economic in essence. It is related to perceived 
threats to socio-economic wellbeing (especially job loss) brought about 
by the open border policies in the context of globalisation, for which 
the EU has been an active agent. (‘British jobs for British workers’ 
sums it up nicely.)
This means that the roots of disaffection and discontent across Europe 
have less to do with European integration itself, or with falling standards 
of living and growing inequality, as they have to do with a type of politi-
cal economy that engenders a socio-economic insecurity to which most 
citizens are subjected. This has entailed the failure of Europe to play its 
role of exemplarity, of helping member-states be at their best. Rather 
the contrary: through the politics of uncertainty and fear the EU insti-
gates, it renders its members at their worst.
If I am right that it is the institutionalised insecurity that is the culprit 
(moreso than the rising inequalities and the social marginalisation of 
the ‘losers of globalisation’), we need to embark on a counter-project 
which I have named a ‘political economy of trust’ at EU-level. It con-
sists in a set of policies and institutions designed to counter economic 
insecurity, in deiance of much of the old ideological truths of the 
Left and the Right. Economic and social precariousness can neither 
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be ixed by labour-market deregulation and austerity policies, nor via 
a resurrection of the bureaucratic redistributive welfare state.
I cannot give here full detail, but let me mention just the two core 
ideas. Instead of providing short-term and ad hoc compensation 
to those who have lost their jobs due to globalisation with devices 
such as the European Union Globalisation Fund, the EU should rede-
sign globalisation away from the laissez-faire, free market formula: 
the global economy is rule-based, we can have the rules we want, 
including high environmental and social standards. The irst trajectory 
is that of a socialist globalisation.
In terms of internal market policy, we need to set in place conditions for 
voluntary employment lexibility. The new economy does not pro-
duce a lot of jobs – not only because jobs are being exported away, but 
also due to robotisation. Even when they recover, European economies 
are likely to ind themselves in a situation of jobless growth. We need, 
therefore, to put in place the conditions for job sharing – a ‘universal 
minimum employment’ policy platform. A radical liberalisation of labour 
markets is necessary to allow the labour markets outside to get in. But 
this needs to be coupled with a trans-European social insurance, based 
on EU denizenship, as well as diminishing working hours and length of 
employment. A secure source of income will encourage those willing to 
exit the labour market to do so. Currently, studies show that even those 
who value leisure time stay in employment because they are haunted 
by inancial and employment uncertainty.
A pragmatic synergy between radical economic liberalisation and 
a robust social safety net at EU-level would allow the return of so-
cially responsible rule – rule that takes full responsibility for the social 
consequences of economic policy. Admittedly, it is not in the remit of 
what is currently politically thinkable. Hopefully, not for long. And hope, 
in contrast to optimism, as the playwright-president-dissident Václav 
Havel observed, ‘is not the conviction that something will turn out well, 
but the certainty that something makes sense’. To the extent that the 
idea of a political economy of trust makes sense, we need to make it 
also politically thinkable. And the British Academy is very well placed 
to do just that.
